



                                                
 
 
Back to Basics:  
Human Rights and the Suffering Imperative 
 




Anniversaries provide a conventionally appropriate opportunity to take stock and, where 
necessary, to remind ourselves of why we hold to the commitments we do. All too often 
the raison d’etre of any collective human venture can be lost amidst the sheer banality of 
daily doing what we do and pursuing the goals we have become accustomed to. The 
question we often forget to ask ourselves is the following: why should we care? 
Expressed more specifically, one may ask, why do you care about the human rights of 
others and why should others care about your human rights? Fear not, this short piece 
will not attempt to reinvent the wheel of human rights theory. Nor am I in a position to 
definitively settle enduring questions concerning the validity and veracity of the ultimate 
justifications offered in support of a commitment to human rights principles tout court. 
My motive is far more modest and intellectually circumspect; having said that, this piece 
is driven by a distinct ambition. In taking stock of current debates in human rights 
theory, I shall argue that we are in danger of losing sight of the ethical imperative of 
human suffering in our discussions about the form and content of human rights in the 
contemporary world. The cornerstone of human rights must be a concern for human 
suffering. This amounts to an ethical truism for human rights theorists but despite, 
perhaps even because of this, it has been obscured from view in much theoretical 
reflection upon human rights as an ethical, legal, political and, increasingly, cultural 
doctrine. This piece takes the reflexive opportunities afforded by the spirit of anniversary 
to re-focus attention upon the basis and strength of our motivations and invites a return 
to the ethical basics of a commitment to human rights. In so doing, I aim to make a 
theoretical case for an appreciation of what might be referred to as a pre-theoretical 
impulse and motive. If human rights are to realise the promise of establishing the 
conditions for a world far less beset by human suffering, then the doctrine must address 
us at a level that does not immediately succumb to the contingency of conceptual 
verbiage and political opportunism.    
 
The Unbearable Lightness of Human Rights Theory 
Any sustained engagement with human rights theory is liable to induce feelings of 
frustration, and even demoralisation, in those seeking justification for commitments they 
already possess. A multitude of authors and arguments populate the terrain. While most 
proclaim their belief in the moral authority of human rights, many appear incapable of 
offering anything more than increasingly conditional and materially contingent arguments 
in support of their professed faith. Analytically speaking, the division may be 
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characterised in terms which locate human rights principles as originating within the 
human agent (or the conditions of human agency) and those which view a commitment 
to human rights as requiring and presupposing not so much an appeal to the human 
condition as an appeal to the development of specific structures, which externally frame 
human agency in a necessarily contingent manner. Those who appeal to the internal 
attributes of the human condition include, albeit in their different ways, Alan Gewirth, 
Bryan Turner and Richard Rorty, while the alternative position is represented by the likes 
of Jack Donnelly and David Beetham. I will not rehearse their respective arguments here. 
Suffice it to say that the substantive disagreements between them are real and significant. 
While some may disagree with the following claim, I think there are good reasons to view 
the latter approach as having gained a greater ascendancy in recent years. The very 
persistence of some human beings’ capacity for wittingly and unwittingly abusing the 
fundamental rights of others has, undoubtedly, had some influence upon a discernible 
slackening of faith in the ultimate goodness of humanity. An appeal to structures and 
institutions appears to bear fewer normative hostages to fortune than that which places 
the onus upon human reason or sentiment as generating a consistent concern for the 
well-being of others. Settling such issues cannot be my concern here. Rather, my analysis 
is driven more by an appreciation of the subsequent effects of engaging with and 
spectating upon such disputes within contemporary human rights theory.  
The more something is argued over, the more intangible and contingent it is 
liable to appear to those not wholly taken up by the persistence of the debate.  It may 
well be that all perception and conception is paradigmatic, to coin Thomas Kuhn’s 
phrase. It may well be that nothing which passes through human reason is genuinely and 
compellingly solid and indisputable. One can accept this premise and still hold a concern 
for relative degrees of contingency. Outside moral philosophy’s sub-speciality of human 
rights theory many things are simply accepted as sufficiently true or at least unworthy of 
serious discussion. Without really knowing how or why, we accept that the earth is round 
and that all material bodies (including our own) come to pass eventually. Within the 
realm of human rights theory, however, such professions of epistemological certainty are 
increasingly apparent only by their ultimate absence. In this realm, the greater one’s 
desire and yearning for ethical certainty, the more one is liable to experience deep 
disappointment and frustration. The extent of this effect appears to be largely lost on 
those who have come to establish successful academic careers in this field. All too often, 
the effects of the disputatious character of much human rights theorising upon other 
interested parties has gone unnoticed by those who argue over the apparent necessity or 
contingency of ethical foundations or attributes of human agency. Many of the 
participants of this debate are motivated precisely by a desire to provide intellectually 
sound and coherent arguments in support of existing commitments. Many, but not all, 
explicitly aim to place a commitment to human rights upon a ground that does not 
reduce to mere articles and professions of normative faith. These are perfectly noble, 
perhaps ultimately essential, aspirations. A great irony of all of this verbiage, however, is 
that to many interested outsiders the effect of the debate is precisely the opposite. If 
human rights theory merges with mere argument, then the desire for a sufficient degree 
of moral consensus, if not certainty, that initially accompanies many human rights 
supporters’ commitment to the doctrine will appear so much more distant and 
unrealisable. One may expect that, should this persist over the next twenty-five years, far 
fewer human rights defenders will take an interest in the grounds for justifying human 
rights principles than is currently the case. Human rights theory runs a very real risk of 
sliding into a form of scholasticism and moral aridity. Some might welcome the exclusion 
of theorists from a domain of human action within which practice appears so 
compelling. Within the global human rights community the worth of theory has often 
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been called into question. Human rights theorists represent a distinct minority which 
many in the more practice-oriented majority view with suspicion or consider a mere 
irrelevance. The unbearable lightness of human rights theory represents, in this respect, 
its greatest weakness.  
 
Babies and Bath-Water       
There are good reasons to hesitate before proclaiming the irrelevance, if not the death, of 
human rights theory. An appeal to practice per se is an overly blunt and indiscriminating 
instrument for the purposes of doing human rights. We live in an age in which the old 
division between facts and norms is increasingly challenged. Not all practice is necessarily 
devoid of normative significance. Indeed, many would argue, as a contemporary variant 
of the older mantra that the ‘personal is political’, that very little is truly and purely 
‘practical’. For example, one might previously have been tempted to contrast the practical 
doing of human rights with another practical exercise, such as riding a bike. Previously, we 
might have concluded that riding a bike was different from practicing human rights to 
the extent that bike-riding is devoid of normative significance or motive whereas the 
practice of human rights is saturated with normativity. The world, however, has changed. 
Riding a bike has now become, for many concerned by rising CO² emissions and the oft-
proclaimed threat this poses to the environment, a demonstrable manifestation of 
ideological commitment. Making sense of bike-riding as a social phenomenon requires an 
engagement with and analysis of the normative dimension of pedal-power. The extent to 
which riding a bike (or many other similarly and apparently banal everyday actions) has 
become motivated by normative commitments marks a radical transformation of the 
phenomenon itself. Justification, rather than merely explanation, becomes a necessary 
element of making sense of this aspect of human behaviour. A previously ‘innocent’ 
phenomenon comes to take on a purpose extrinsic to itself. Many now choose to ride a 
bike as a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself. We may not definitively be able 
to justify the end which motivates the practice, such is the apparently interminable 
character of normative theorising, but we cannot understand why the practice occurs 
without engaging with normative analysis. Similarly, we cannot understand why the 
practice doesn’t occur more often (in respect of those who choose not to opt for two 
wheels) without engaging in normative analysis. Excluding the normative in the name of 
practical imperatives would obscure from view an essential property of the phenomenon 
itself: the baby would be lost with the bath-water’s expulsion.              
We might say that many more areas of the domain of practical human agency are 
taking on the ineliminably normative character which human rights practice has always 
necessarily possessed. Setting to one side the view of the allegedly disinterested observer 
and focusing solely upon the participant, when one does human rights one is necessarily 
already enmeshed within the fabric of normativity: one’s action is necessarily motivated 
by the pursuit of goals and ideals which aim not to simply describe the world but to 
judge it and to alter it where necessary. Human rights devoid of a normative dimension is 
a myth which serves little purpose, practical or otherwise. This does not mean that all 
human rights practitioners must also be moral philosophers. At the ground level few of 
us are systematically required to continually justify what we do. However, understanding 
and subsequently directing the development of the doctrine does require the application 
of a normative sensitivity. Many who are prepared to acknowledge the indispensable role 
of an engagement with the normative sphere for human rights will nevertheless rightly 
point to one potentially very damaging consequence of this particular field of expertise 
which we have already touched upon: the frustration and disappointment which many 
feel who, turning to moral philosophy for normative truths, encounter only the opposite. 
Acknowledging the indispensability of normativity for human rights nevertheless appears 
Essex Human Rights Review Vol. 5 No. 1 July 2008 
 
                                                               Andrew Fagan                                                             4 
                                                             
to entail the deeply ironic consequence of raising doubt over the ultimate veracity of 
human rights principles as normative phenomena, rather than as items in a legal 
document. We cannot justify what we do without engaging with the normative sphere, 
but the normative sphere itself appears to exclude the very truth criteria that we require if 
our doctrine is not to appear merely pragmatic and conditional upon utterly partial 
interests. What appears to be lacking is some sufficiently compelling imperative out of 
which a commitment to human rights can emerge and in accordance with which the 
scope of human rights may be framed.  
 
The Suffering Imperative 
Suffering is not alien to the human condition or to the development of humanity as a 
concept. Indeed, many philosophers and thinkers have gone so far as to view suffering as 
one of the, if not the, definitive characteristics of humanity. Nor can it be said that 
suffering has played an insignificant role in the development of human rights. Setting to 
one side debates over the basis and form of so-called natural rights, which span several 
centuries of mostly European thought, we must acknowledge that the modern human 
rights movement was fundamentally motivated, amongst other things, as a response to 
the Holocaust, that hideous icon of human suffering for post-war generations. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) must be understood, in part, as an 
historical doctrine and as motivated by that which defied discussion and interpretation 
but simply was fundamentally and utterly wrong.  This moral truth is inscribed within the 
very foundation stone of the modern human rights movement. The greater part of the 
moral impetus and authority of the human rights doctrine was provided by Auschwitz 
and the other death camps, within which humanity was shown to be one of the most 
contemptible myths of the modern age. The subsequent human rights movement aimed, 
in part, to restore a commitment to humanity and human dignity. The UDHR represents 
an attempt to draw a definitive normative line in the sand between what constitutes the 
fundamental conditions for right and wrong in the primarily public sphere. Given its 
historical backdrop we might say that the modern human rights movement was 
established against the grain of history’s development. The success of the movement 
must be measured by the extent to which it has altered and, to some extent, reconfigured 
history’s grain.  Having said that, it is clear that the human rights movement has 
developed extensively in the sixty years since the UDHR was formally presented to the 
world. While the human rights movement was driven by human suffering, the doctrine 
and its application has extended well beyond such morally compelling phenomena to 
embrace aspects of public and private life which do not and cannot possess the 
compelling and unequivocal character of genocide. By extending its reach, the human 
rights movement has, inevitably perhaps, raised concerns amongst some about the 
justification and validity of its efforts. This is an important development for the human 
rights movement, and one that requires a response which draws upon, rather than seeks 
to obscure, the source of human rights’ moral authority.          
In many parts of the world human suffering remains demonstrable and ever-
present. However, in that part of the world where the normative basis of human rights is 
most frequently discussed and pondered, suffering is no longer a clear feature of daily 
life. Underachievement, frustration, high levels of stress and all of the other pathological 
symptoms of modern living persist, but the kind of suffering to which human rights has 
typically responded is much less frequent. In this context, the development of human 
rights has closely reflected developments in liberal political and legal theory. Human 
rights in the western hemisphere has long shared an elective affinity with liberalism. The 
two are not synonymous but are closely interrelated. For its part, liberalism has paid little 
sustained attention to human suffering per se. The substance of human life has not 
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enjoyed centre-stage attention within liberalism for some considerable time. Indeed, in 
recent decades many liberal philosophers have largely turned away from previous 
attempts to promote and protect substantive conceptions of how life can be lived well, 
and turned instead towards circumscribing and promoting demonstrably more formalistic 
ideals. Initially attracted by a conception of justice as impartiality, liberal philosophers 
such as John Rawls and Charles Larmore have sought to rest liberalism’s moral authority 
upon an appeal to neutrality as a variant of equality. Liberal jurisprudence reflects this 
development to the extent that its focus has shifted fundamentally towards equality and 
non-discrimination as those ideals which legitimate law should uphold and protect. Few 
would oppose the value of equality and non-discrimination. However, what this 
development has obscured from view is the condition of human suffering, the 
eradication or at least fundamental reduction of which should remain our principal 
concern. Human beings suffer as a consequence of inequality and discrimination, but 
suffering itself is neither exhausted by nor reducible to these criteria. Nor can it be 
legitimately said that simply establishing such ideals will sufficiently reduce human 
suffering throughout the world. As a consequence of the spread of a mere formalistic 
account of ethics and law that is a discernible feature of modern societies, liberals and 
human rights theorists alike are in danger of forgetting the force and significance of 
human suffering. Human rights theorists need to urgently reengage with the 
phenomenon of human suffering as an ethical imperative in the light of which human 
rights may begin to reacquire the depth of authority it once possessed. 
            
Yes, But……. 
In many respects, there might appear to be little need to remind ourselves of the sheer 
importance of human suffering for human rights: attempts to do so might thereby appear 
somewhat platitudinous or surplus to requirements. They certainly aren’t new. Theorists 
sympathetic to human rights such as Bryan Turner and Amartya Sen have recently 
presented normative arguments founded upon corporeality and vulnerability. Both of 
these have been subject to criticism from various quarters, testifying to the persistence of 
views within human rights theory which continue, I believe, to miss the ultimate point of 
the doctrine. An appeal to human suffering as the ethical ground of human rights is 
certainly susceptible to criticism. Some will argue that suffering is simply too subjective 
and immeasurable for the purposes of generating a global ethical doctrine. Others might 
argue that an appeal to suffering cannot generate an ethic of reciprocity since not 
everyone is ultimately vulnerable to the same degree of suffering: if I am highly unlikely 
ever to suffer malnutrition why should I ultimately care about those who do? On this 
view, an appeal to suffering serves only to expose the lack of a common and mutually 
reciprocal global space within which human rights can play a fundamental role. Still 
others might worry about the implications of an appeal to suffering for those human 
rights which might appear somewhat more ‘procedural’, less visceral perhaps, than 
others. A focus upon suffering might appear to tip the balance towards economic, social 
and cultural rights and thereby challenge the Vienna Declaration’s insistence upon the 
parity and mutually interdependent relationship that is deemed to exist between civil, 
political and economic, social and cultural rights. Finally, although this will not exhaust 
the potential litany of criticism, some might fear that a focus upon suffering will raise the 
spectre of an unduly paternalistic human rights regime interfering in the affairs of 
individuals and communities whose practices might appear harmful to some but not 
necessarily to the agents in question. 
Each one of the above criticisms has merit and requires a serious engagement 
and response if a theory of human rights based primarily upon the imperative to alleviate 
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systematic human suffering is to be worthy of respect and consideration. For the time 
being, I think it is vitally important to reflect upon the motives of one’s actions and 
commitments from time to time: anniversaries afford just such an opportunity. Countless 
millions of human beings continue to live and die in miserable conditions. Countless 
millions of human beings continue to suffer from circumstances and conditions over 
which they have little, if any, control. This suffering is largely of our collective making 
and results from our actions and inactions. Some have lost sight of the enduring 
phenomenon of human suffering. The extent to which we come to take suffering either 
for granted or as a merely unavoidable fact of life has a direct bearing upon the 
persistence of those conditions which the modern human rights movement sought to 
eradicate. The last twenty-five years have been marked by successes and failures. The 
human rights movement needs to take responsibility, to some extent, for both. If the 
next twenty-five years are to prove more successful for us all, then we must never lose 
sight of human suffering.                
